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COMPARING ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES ABOUT
CONGRESS'S ROLE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Charles Tiefer*
Mark Tushnet's Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts1
presents many aspects of the theme expressed in its title. I find
most interesting the aspect concerning Congress's role in constitu-
tional law. I like this aspect because I spent almost two decades
working on constitutional law in Congress, principally as the House
of Representatives' Solicitor and Deputy General Counsel
representing the House of Representatives in countless constitu-
tional controversies,2 and I have written a good deal about it.3
Tushnet provides us with an alternative perspective from which we
can view Congress both during that time and since. Tushnet's book
is kind enough to cite some of my works and I have both personal
and professional admiration for what he has done.
There is what I will call a standard, "court-centered" paradigm of
constitutional law.4 And, Tushnet provides an alternative termed
"populist constitutional law."5 Tushnet's populist constitutional law
compares interestingly to another, third alternative to the standard,
"court-centered" paradigm. I will call this third alternative the
"political dynamics" approach to constitutional law. With three
alternatives to contrast, we can have a lot of fun and perhaps also
shed a little light.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. Solicitor and
Deputy General Counsel for the House of Representatives, 1984-95. B.A., 1974, Columbia
University; J.D., 1977, Harvard Law School.
1. MARK TUSHNET, TAiNG TUE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
2. For a discussion of that post and what it entails, see Charles Tiefer, The Senate and
House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of Representing in Court the Institutional Congressional
Client, 61 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1998).
3. See, e.g., CHARLES TiEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENT (1994) (regarding
Congressional-Executive relations during the Bush Administration); CHARLES TIEFER,
CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1989) (a 1000-page treatise about Congress).
4. Actually, there are many possible variants ofjudicial supremacy views. See Scott E.
Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 24 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 359, 389 (1997) (revisiting judicial supremacy).
5. TUSHNET, supra note 1, at x.
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The first section of this article will sketch the three
alternatives-court-centered, Tushnet's populist, and political
dynamics-emphasizing Tushnet's populist approach. The second
section will take us through how a few specific areas receive
treatment under each of the three alternatives. The final section will
discuss what is so wonderful about Tushnet's approach.
I. THREE APPROACHES: COURT-CENTERED, TUSHNET'S POPULIST,
AND POLITICAL DYNAMICS
Most of us have taken a course in constitutional law using a
casebook, that is, a fat collection of predominantly Supreme Court
opinions. So, most of us learned constitutional law from an implic-
itly court-centered paradigm.6 Let me recite that paradigm with the
alienated, stand-offish tone of a Martian anthropologist strolling
down Main Street and talking about the obvious and familiar.
The court-centered view of constitutional law consists of a tour of
Supreme Court opinions. Often it starts with Marbury v. Madison,7
McCulloch v. Maryland,' and other decisions of the Marshall Court
that, in this view, created the structure and process of constitutional
law. It then continues, perhaps subject area by subject area, from
older Supreme Court decisions that may or may not have survived,
to more recent ones. For example, First Amendment law might go
through the cases about subversives of the 1920s and 1950s, leading
up to the golden years of the Warren Court.9 It might then come to
current major frontier cases regarding campaign finance, free
exercise of religion, and commercial speech.' ° As in other descrip-
6. There are exceptions. For example, see LOU FISHER,AmERICANCONSTITUTIONALLAW
(3d ed. 2000), a casebook written by one of the leading scholars of the political dynamics of
constitutional law.
7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
8. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
9. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (holding that a statute that
failed to distinguish advocacy from incitement to imminent lawless action violated the First
Amendment); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,516 (1951) (upholding a statute making
it a crime to teach or advocate the violent overthrow of any government in the United States);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 380 (1927) (holding that a state statute based on the
state's power to protect the public from violent political action is constitutional).
10. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1976) (upholding several contribution
limits to campaigns, but allowing unlimited expenditures based on the fact that such
restrictions would restrict political expression under the First Amendment); Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (holding that the free exercise clause did not prohibit
the application of Oregon drug laws to ceremonial ingestion of peyote); Central Hudson Gas
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tions of court-centered law, the court-centered view of constitutional
law treats the law as owing a little something to the original pre-
judicial text-in this instance, the Constitution, but in other
instances, a statute, regulation, contract, will, or the like. However,
the open-ended nature of the text leaves room for the
exponents-namely the courts-to create doctrines, expressed partly
by holdings and partly by statements in opinions, and the court-
centered view of constitutional law locates that law almost wholly
within the expounding opinions.
The court-centered view has what Alexander Bickel called the
counter-majoritarian problem, that, in our democracy, the elected
branches of government have legitimacy from the consent of the
governed,. and the unelected judiciary does not.1 For unelected
courts to strike down statutes by the elected Congress poses the
counter-majoritarian problem in acute form.'2
Those presenting the court-centered view may often express
regret that sometimes the Court has taken a wrong turn, whereas
Congress did something right. In City of Boerne v. Flores,3 a key
recent example, even some (but not all 4) court-centered constitu-
tional scholars think Congress did something right by passing the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act,'5 while the Court did something
wrong by striking it down.'6 But, it no more shakes the faith of the
court-centered constitutionalists that bad things sometimes happen
to good statutes, than the observed happening of bad things to good
people causes the pious to abandon their faith in the deity.
Of course, if we have a warm and fuzzy feeling about enlightened
judges, as law students often have after their first-year case-
oriented courses, and the opposite feeling about unenlightened
legislators, as cynical newspaper readers sometimes have, then the
counter-majoritarian problem does not seem acute. Judges seem
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571-72 (1980) (holding that a state's interest in
preventing inequities in utility rates was not a constitutionally adequate reason for
restricting protected speech).
11. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (2d ed. Yale Univ. Press
1986) (1962).
12. See id.
13. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
14. See generally Saikrishna Prakash,A Comment on Congressional Enforcement, 32 IND.
L. REV. 193 (1998).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994).
16. See David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and
Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 31, 32 (1997).
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trustworthy and elected officials do not. But, exposure to history and
life experience counteract the judge-worship of the first-year law
student. For example, as progressives get older, they come not to
have such warm and fuzzy feelings about Justices Scalia and
Thomas, particularly when thinking about what their judicial
review would do if those Justices had a working majority on the
Court backing them. Then Congress-particularly the Congress of
the 1960s and 1970s and of 1987-95 that enacted so much good
legislation on civil rights, women's rights, environmental law, and
individual rights vis-&-vis state and local officials-does not seem
quite so bad.
Conversely, some conservatives follow a similar analytical route."
As they acquire knowledge of history and life experience, they too
can lose the warm and fuzzy feeling about judges of the first-year
law student. They think about what Justices Brennan and Douglas
did, such as what conservatives consider to be the worst excesses of
the Warren Court and its aftermath: from finding an implied
privacy right to abortion, to prisoners' rights, to an expansive
exclusionary rule applicable to evidence of crimes obtained even
under a warrant (when the warrant turns out to be challengeable). 8
Then, the conservatives focus on elected figures like President
Reagan, 9 and the Congress of the 1990s, with some enactments to
their liking such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 199320
and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,21 combined with the
turnover and changes in party control that show members of
Congress's lack of entrenchment. Then, the elected branches of
government do not seem quite so bad to them in comparison to the
Court. Both progressives and conservatives see that putting
unelected officials (Justices) in office for life, without the moderating
17. See Edwin Meese III, Putting the Federal Judiciary Back on the Constitutional Track,
14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 782 (1998).
18. See Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965) (recognizingthe constitutionally
protected right of privacy of married persons to use contraception); Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483,490 (1969) (holding that a state prison regulation prohibiting inmates from helping
other prisoners prepare petitions for postconviction was invalid); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
660 (1961) (requiring state officers to comply with the Fourth Amendment when making
searches and extending the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to prosecutions in state
courts).
19. President-adulation had a particularly strong influence on conservatives. For a
response, see Peter M. Shane, Reflections in Three Mirrors: Complexities of Representation
in a Constituitonal Democracy, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 693 (1999).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994).
21. Pub. L. No. 104-34, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.); see Shane, supra note 19, at 790 & nn.49-50.
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effect of public accountability, and letting them make major
decisions with little control, has its downsides compared to keeping
the power in officials (presidents or members of Congress) whose
stay in office is limited, who have many controls, who care what the
public and press think of them, and who, therefore, tend not to stray
for very long in a consistent direction away from overwhelming
consensus views of the American public.
Now, let us look at Tushnet's populist constitutional paradigm.22
In the Tushnet view, we can imagine the end of judicial review and
the discovery that such an end has more benefits and fewer
downsides than the court-centered view suggests. Tushnet separates
the central aspects of constitutional law that the public most cares
about, the "thin Constitution," from the many aspects the public
appropriately need not care so much about, the "thick Constitu-
tion."' As to the thin Constitution, ultimately we can, and should,
depend on the people's commitment to constitutional values, filtered
through the structure and process of our representative democracy.
So, Congress can and should have a large role in constitutional law.
Disputes about constitutional law should get debated and resolved
(temporarily or permanently) in lots ofways, engaging the public at
its best, rather than depending upon unelected judges whose
influence may, paradoxically, bring out the worst in elected officials
and the public.
In the court-centered view, the boundary between politics and law
is a wide street between two forums, namely, First Street N.E. in
Washington, D.C., which separates the Capitol on the west side
from the Supreme Court on the east side. In the Tushnet populist
view, the boundary between politics and law is much more complex
and subtle.24 It is the change in attitude between when Joe Smith
and Jane Doe, or Representative Smith and Representative Doe,
discuss and debate mere policy decisions like farm prices, and when
they discuss and debate an issue that they, as Americans, will
recognize has a constitutional aspect, such as the issue of vouchers
expendable on parochial schools and its relation to the Establish-
ment Clause.
Chapters Six and Seven of Tushnet's book ("Assessing Judicial
Review" and "Against Judicial Review," respectively) particularly
22. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 181-82.
23. See id. at 9-14.
24. See id. at 186-87.
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work on the superior benefits and lesser downsides of doing without
judicial review." But it is earlier, in Chapter Three ("The Question
of Capacity"), that Tushnet challenges the main argument of the
court-centered view as to why Congress must not have too large a
role: the asserted incapacity of Congress as an institution due to the
asserted evils of legislators' reelection incentive.26 Constitutional
law exists now, and should exist even more in an ideal situation, not
primarily in the minds and discourse ofjudges, but in the minds and
discourse of all those who debate and resolve constitutional issues,
including the American public and its elected political representa-
tives. The reelection incentive, by rooting Congress in a public which
has a commitment to constitutional values, will ultimately help, not
hinder, the creation of valid constitutional law. A ready analogy
exists in Great Britain where the courts do not overturn Acts of
Parliament, and Parliament nevertheless maintains something of
a constitutional system (for example, a stable, democratic govern-
mental structure and civil liberties, even in the absence of a written
constitution). Parliament has faithfully preserved Britain's democ-
racy and civil liberties, not in spite of, but because of, the reelection
incentives of Members of Parliament, which keep them rooted in a
public that adheres to constitutional values.
Tushnet's method consists primarily of drawing upon other
commentators, mostly legal ones but also some political scientists
and historians. He takes their analysis of some dispute in constitu-
tional law, and reviews it from his new angle of imagining whether
it undercuts the support for judicial review or bolsters the support
for nonjudicial constitutional debate and decision-making. For
example, he briefly discusses the subject of voting rights, drawing
upon a superb analysis by Peter Shane, one of the leading academic
analysts of the beneficial role of Congress in constitutional law.27 As
Shane describes, and Tushnet confirms, Congress's action on voting
rights legislation shows, in Tushnet's words, "[e]liminating judicial
review does not mean doing away with judicially enforceable rights.
We can still create statutory rights that can be as inspiring as
constitutional ones, and sometimes more so. "2
25. See id. at 129-76.
26. See id. at 54-71.
27. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 168-69; see also Peter M. Shane, Voting Rights and the
'Statutory Constitution', 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243 (1993).
28. TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 168.
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What do I mean by my third alternative of "political dynamics"?29
It is the view that the existing system of constitutional law consists
of a cross between the exaggerated depiction in the court-centered
view that makes judicial review appear historically and currently as
the all-powerful engine of constitutionalism, and Tushnet's thought-
experiment that imagines a complete end to judicial review and the
resulting creation of a constitutional system wholly without courts
striking down Acts of Congress. "Political dynamics" analyzes
historic and current constitutional law to assess that judicial review
has much less significance than the court-centered view would
suggest, and that the elected branches have a good deal of what
Tushnet thinks it would take his thought-experiment for them to
have in the way of influence over constitutional law.3" I will call the
person espousing the political dynamics view the "political
dynamicist" or "poli-dynamicist"; forgive me, patient readers, if the
term bothers you.
Like Tushnet, the poli-dynamicist locates constitutional law much
more in the minds and discourse of the public and its representa-
tives than in the minds and discourse ofjudges. Also like Tushnet,
the poli-dynamicist emphasizes the parts of constitutional law that
never get to court for reasons like the political question doctrine,
such as the allocation between the President and Congress of the
powers over foreign affairs and national security conferred by the
Constitution,3 or the Congressional procedures in impeachment
trials and investigations of the President.2 Again, like Tushnet,
political dynamicists also emphasize the processes of constitutional
law that may affect the courts but occur outside the courts, like the
appointment process for Supreme Court Justices that kept Robert
Bork off the Court and put (currently) two women, one black and
two Jews on a Court that at one time had been solidly Christian
(until the 1910s), solidly white (until the 1960s), and solidly male
(until the 1980s).
29. The leading work on this subject is Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVINs, POLITICAL
DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1996).
30. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 163-72.
31. See generally STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (1990).
32. See generally Charles Tiefer, The Controversial Transition between Investigating the
President and Impeaching Him, 14 ST. JOHN'S COMIENTARY 111 (1999); Charles Tiefer, The
Senate Trial of President Clinton, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 2000); Charles Tiefer,
The Specially Investigated President, 5 UNiv. Cin. ROUNDTABLE 143-204 (1998).
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Unlike Tushnet, the poli-dynamicists need no thought-experi-
ments to construct their paradigm. They treat their alternative to
the court-centered view not primarily as an exploration of an
imaginary situation, but as a real exploration of the actual situation.
And, Tushnet's interest seems to me to be primarily normative-to
decide whether eliminating judicial review would be good or bad.
Poli-dynamicists need not take a normative view, but can exercise
their skills quite fully in trying to understand how constitutional
law works outside the courts. Whereas Tushnet primarily explores
by the method of discussing what other commentators have written,
the poli-dynamicist has to decipher the encoded record of what
Congress and the President have done, a record much harder to read
than Supreme Court opinions. For example, Louis Fisher's excellent
book on congressional-presidential relations requires him to study
not only judicial opinions but the press, history, the Congressional
Record, congressional hearings and reports, presidential documents,
Justice Department opinions, and all kinds of extraordinarily arcane
sources like the portions in Asher Hinds's treatise on House of
Representatives precedents that deals with how the House of
Representatives obtains information to perform its constitutional
function in enacting statutes for foreign affairs obligations.33
II. CLOSER COMPARISONS OF THE THREE ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES
Let us discuss some concrete illustrations of the three alternative
approaches in action as a basis for closer comparison. As one
example, let us take the abortion issue.
In a course on constitutional law, we might get the standard
court-centered approach. This would take us along the major
Supreme Court cases, starting withRoe v. Wade.34 As a supplement
to these cases, the course might discuss the various attempts of
commentators to come up with better articulations of the kinds of
court-oriented theories than those of the judges themselves. For
example, it might look for a better privacy-based theory than that
of Justice Blackmun's in Roe, or, on the other side of the debate, a
33. See Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT (rev. 4th ed. 1997). Fisher may well be the leading poli-dynamicist of our time.
34. 410 U.S. 13 (1973).
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better theory for reducing the courts' role in abortion than that of
the dissenters in recent decisions reaffirming Roe.
Tushnet uses abortion to show that victories in judicial review can
have paradoxical effects.35 He describes how Roe v. Wade and its
progeny energized abortion opponents. "[C]onservative activists in
the Republican party gained control overjudicial appointments, and
insisted on appointing only right-wing judges. The pro-choice
victories themselves eroded with that transformation."36 Tushnet
also describes how judicial review lends itself to a rhetoric of rights
(here, the right to abortion) and opposing counter-rights (here, the
opposingviewpoint arguing"the fetus's fundamental right to life"). 37
This means "[c]ompromises may seem unacceptable in principle"
and so "policy will swing wildly from protecting one right and
denying the counter-right to protecting the counter-right and
denying the initial one."3" In short, where the court-centered
constitutionalist only looks at the Court's decisions and sees them
as straightforwardly expounding constitutional law, Tushnet sees
the Court's decisions as affecting political processes and having
paradoxical effects of producing the opposite (and deleterious)
impact on constitutional law rather than what would be expected.39
The poli-dynamicist starts with some agreement with Tushnet-
for example, that instead of a narrow focus on what judges do and
say, we also learn by looking at movement and activity outside the
Court, such as the shaping of judicial appointments. However, the
poli-dynamicist does so not as the start of an alternative imaginary
theory of a constitutional world without judicial review, but as part
of looking at how much of our current constitutional world consists
of nonjudicial disputes and decisions in which the judicial opinions
are simply a component and, in fact, a component with much less
significance than in the court-centered commentary.
For example, because the Court declines to supervise Congress's
decisions, via the various versions of the Hyde Amendments, ° about
federal funding of abortions for the poor, Congress makes and
35. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 135-41.
36. Id. at 139.
37. Id. at 139-40.
38. Id. at 140.
39. See id.
40. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,312-28 (1980); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358,
369 (1980).
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remakes those decisions by appropriation-bill debates every year.6'
For another example, Congress and the President have had major
debates over the years about international family planning policy,
a realm the Court says nothing about.42 And, of course, even when
the Court decides to allow state restrictions on abortion such as
parental notification,43 political dynamics created and put forward
the state laws that led to those decisions, and shaped the context of
the Court's decision (for example, the position of the Solicitor
General in those cases, and the amicus filings by influential groups).
Moreover, political dynamics decided which states use the discretion
left them by the Court, and which states do not. Hence, even in this
area of the constitutional law (abortion) that has a very large and
visible judicial content, political dynamics shapes policy as much or
more than what the judges do and say. The poli-dynamicist could
stop with this analysis and choose to make no normative conclusions
at all about judicial review, content to understand how there can be
a great deal to constitutional law besides judicial review; whereas,
Tushnet's central focus is his normative conclusion about judicial
review.'
Now let us turn to two examples, the Competition in Contracting
Act of 1984 ("CICA")41 story and the flag-burning story, discussed in
Tushnet's book, with which Tushnet and I were involved when they
occurred. 6 I am pleased that he has continued to think so
insightfully about these instances, and to use them so well to build
his larger jurisprudence.47
41. See Jon F. Metz et al., A Review ofAbortion Policy: Legality, Medicaid Funding, and
Parental Involvement, 1967-1994, 17 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 1 (1995) (providing a detailed
history of the legal evolution of Medicaid funding and parental notification).
42. This controversyis discussed in Charles Tiefer,Adjusting Sovereignty: Contemporary
Congressional-Executive Interactions about International Organizations, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J.
(forthcoming 2000).
43. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990) (upholding a
statute requiring parental notification to be given by a physician performing an abortion on
a minor); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of a
state statute requiring parental notification for an abortion performed on a minor).
44. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 129-76 (providing a detailed history of the legal
evolution of Medicaid funding and parental notification for abortion).
45. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 31
U.S.C., 40 U.S.C., 41 U.S.C.).
46. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 116-19.
47. Tushnet's use of footnotes and a bibliography give out generous credit. I find Tushnet
in this book, as in his previous writings and in person, remarkably generous with intellectual
credit, free of egotism and status-hangups, and a pleasure to watch in intellectual action.
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In the mid-1980s, a political firestorm occurred over Attorney
General Edwin Meese's strongly-stated and acted-upon position that
he could declare statutes unconstitutional and instruct the Execu-
tive Branch to disobey them, even contrary to judicial decisions
upholding the statutes." As Tushnet summarizes, "[t]he Reagan
administration decided that an obscure statute called the Competi-
tion in Contracting Act unconstitutionally infringed on the presi-
dent's prerogatives."49 The statute was called "CICA" for short, so,
we may call this the "CICA story." As Tushnet explains, CICA
"directed the executive branch to refrain from awarding a contract
if it was notified by the Comptroller-General, an official located in
the legislative branch, that there were questions about the proposed
contract." °
Congress, particularly the Democrat-controlled House of Repre-
sentatives and, most particularly, two of its committees, "took out
after the administration."5 Soon, Meese retreated.52 Some district
court and appellate opinions not only upheld the statute, but
harshly condemned Meese's doctrine about his powers.53 Although
the Justice Department has only partly retreated and in other
respects has held its ground,54 it has not acted on that issue again
with the same extreme arrogance as Meese manifested.55
48. See Edwin Meese MIT, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 986 (1987).
49. TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 116. Tushnet may call the Competition in ContractingAct
("CICA") obscure if he likes. Perhaps to those who teach constitutional law, CICA is obscure.
As the coauthor ofa casebook that celebrates the importance of the field of law in which CICA
looms large, see CHARLES TiEFER & WLLIAMA. SHOOK, GOVERNMENT CoNTRAcT LAw (1999),
I feel I must defend CICA as very well-known and highly visible. I will try not to speak
negatively of Tushnet, but the asserted obscurity of government contract law is a sensitive
subject. I must warn him (entirely injest) that professors who teach jurisprudence, and who
cite other jurisprudents, live in a glass house on the subject of "obscure" legal matters and
should take care with the throwing of stones.
50. TUSHNET, supra note 1 at 116.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. See, e.g., Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 1988); Parola
v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 1988); Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979, 992 n.8 (3d Cir. 1986).
54. See generally Walter Dellinger, Legal Opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel to the
Honorable Abner J. Mikva, 48 AR. L. REV. 313 (1994).
55. My own role was to represent the House of Representatives in the court cases, to
testify at hearings and, most gratifyingly, to see the court borrow some of my writings and
incorporate them in the opinions. I wrote the original opinion within Congress defending
CICA. See CHARLES TIEFER, CONSTITUTIONALrY OF THE COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING ACT,
H.R. REP. No. 98-1157, at 59 (1984) (appendix to congressional committee report). This drew
on an earlier article of mine that Tushnet cites. See Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of
Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U.L. REv. 59 (1983). After
Meese's challenge, I testified at hearings. See Statement Regarding the Executive Branch's
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How do our three paradigms deal with this most interesting
instance? The court-centered approach might possibly miss the
whole thing because the Supreme Court did not write any opinions
on the matter. If a court-centered account did reach down to the
lower court opinions, it would tell an interesting story, to be sure,
but only a two-dimensional one. A court-centered account makes it
look as though executive excess had been curbed by judicial review,
and as though constitutional law consists predominantly, if not
solely, of the doctrines and authority cited in judicial opinions. I
think very highly of the judges who wrote those opinions, and
particularly of district court Judge Harold Ackerman, who, deci-
sively and articulately, first stood up to Meese,56 but it does not
detract in any way from Judge Ackerman's historic stand to say that
a court-centered account is not complete.
Tushnet's populist constitutional approach uses the instance to
answer the question: 'Will we get a better enforced Constitution if
we rely on self-enforcing structures than if we rely on judicial
enforcement, acknowledging that neither self-enforcement nor
judicial enforcement leads to perfect enforcement?""7 Tushnet ties
the CICA story to James Madison's theories about how the govern-
ment's structure (not judicial review) would promote constitutional
liberty.5" He explains how the turning point in the CICA story came
when the congressional committees publicly confronted Meese and
Meese backed down.59 Finally, Tushnet gives a wonderfully terse
analysis: "The process is simple: Political conflicts occur, the parties
explain their positions to the public, and some resolution is
reached."60
A poli-dynamicist might fully approve of Tushnet's account and
applaud his analysis, but would simply take the result in a different
direction. Rather than fueling the thought-experiment about how a
system would work without judicial review, a poli-dynamicist would
use the CICA story to show the complex ways our current system
Declaration that the Competition in ContractingAct is Unconstitutional: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 257-7 (1985). Tushnet
testified at the same hearing, which gives his version of the story special gusto and insight.
56. See Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 607 F. Supp. 962 (D.N.J.
1985) (Ackerman, J.), affd, 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1986).
57. TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 96.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 116.
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depends as much on congressional and public attitudes on constitu-
tional law, as on courts.61
For example, as a participant in these events, I would say that a
decisive aspect in the CICA story came with mounting coverage in
the national press, both news and editorial pages. The court-
centered approach treats what judges say as "real" law and what is
said in legislative forums as "not real." But, when a controversy over
constitutional law erupts in both types of forums, the news covers
both forums, and looking at the news coverage and its effects
emphasizes the similarities ofjudicial and legislative forums. Both
forums provide grist for the public's nongovernmental normative
voice, as the two sides and the observers all speak in press and
editorial commentary. Both forums thereby shape the incentive
systems for political actors who reach their office, and maintain
their authority in it, in part by their attention to the way the
public's nongovernmental normative voice speaks in the press.
In that sense, the press does not merely report "real" constitu-
tional law happening in the courts or elsewhere. The medium is the
message; the press coverage is itself the "real" stuff of constitutional
law for those constitutional controversies fought out in the public
eye by official actors sensitive to press. From this viewpoint, court-
centered constitutional law casebooks consist of one peculiar part of
the press with some significance, but only limited significance.
Casebooks are significant not because they contain the only type of
thing (Supreme Court opinions and commentary thereon) that
makes up constitutional law, but rather because at a formative
stage, law students in training as potential lawyers read such
casebooks-rather than, say, reading collections from the New York
Times editorial page, or books loaded with the materials created in
the political process. However, as law students graduate and move
along in their careers toward the attainment of significant of-
fices-judicial, executive, or legislative-they supplement that
straitened early diet with a good deal more press coverage of
constitutional events. The casebook tells a certain narrow and
rarifled kind of doctrine, but the press, like life experience, adds
other elements that make up constitutional law disputes and
outcomes-elements like power, interests, institutional patterns,
strategies and tactics, personalities, and cultural underpinnings.
These are not gossip. The poli-dynamicist demonstrates that these
61. See id. at 114.
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are as much a part of the kind of constitutional law involved in
public controversies as rarified doctrine.
A second example consists of the 1989-90 flag-burning interaction
discussed by Tushnet and myself as follows.62 Texas had a statute
banning flag-burning. The Supreme Court struck it down by a five-
to-four decision.6" A national outcry ensued. President Bush called
for a constitutional amendment to cut back on the First Amend-
ment, and thereby to protect the flag.64 The Democratic Congress
instead passed the Flag Protection Act of 1989,65 for which there was
some reason to think there might be a five-to-four decision the other
way.66 On review, the Court struck this statute down also, by the
same five-to-four count as the first time.6" Although efforts contin-
ued to adopt a constitutional amendment, the fervor cooled off by
the time of the second Supreme Court decision, and so no constitu-
tional amendment has been adopted by Congress (let alone by the
states).
A court-centered account would stick to the two Supreme Court
decisions. With effort, we can find some interest in that doctrinal
account. We might look at the flag decisions as part of the line of
decisions on the conduct/speech distinction, for the subtle ways the
Court has distinguished between the legislative power to regulate
other kinds of conduct like burning draft cards, and the lack of
power to regulate the conduct of burning flags. Or, we might look at
the flag decisions as illustrating the Court's ability to refuse to pay
attention, in this instance, to two elements: deference to the
Congress that held hearings and wrote reports about the Act's
constitutionality; and original intent, since a strong argument can
be made that at the time of the Framers, it would have been thought
entirely proper for the government to protect the flag as an incident
of sovereignty.
Tushnet's populist constitutional account uses the incident to
show one of the bad effects ofjudicial review-its creating a "judicial
62. See id. at 58-60; Charles Tiefer, The Flag-Burning Controversy of 1989-90: Congress'
Valid Role in Constitutional Dialogue, 29 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 357, 357-98 (1992).
63. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989).
64. See 135 CONG. REC. H3134 (daily ed. June 27, 1989) (statement of Rep. Michel
describing President Bush's public call for a constitutional amendment).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1989).
66. See Tiefer, supra note 62, at 365-68.
67. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990).
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overhang" with bad influences on the legislature." In Tushnet's
summary, Congress had a serious question before it: "[i]n dealing
with flag-burning, the issue we as a people have to confront is
whether the flag's symbolic value is so great that we should protect
it even at some cost to the protection of free expression."" By setting
up First Amendment tests that did not tolerate balancing, "[t]he
Court's decisions made it nearly impossible for Congress to face that
issue."7" Tushnet fits this instance in with other examples of how
the "judicial overhang" distorts, impairs, or misleads what would
otherwise be a valuable legislative process of debating constitutional
issues.7
I have previously written my poli-dynamicist account of the flag-
burning matter,72 on which Tushnet draws. We agree that the
greater interest of this matter for understanding constitutional law
lies outside the Court, in the processes surrounding congressional
action. No one could more approve Tushnet's insight that the
judicial overhang interfered with congressional efforts at a political
resolution of the flag-burning issue drawing upon the public's quite
strong devotion to the First Amendment. The poli-dynamicist's
focus simply shifts from the theoretical situation if judicial review
had not imposed that overhang, to the very large role in practice,
notwithstanding judicial review, of nonjudicial, and especially
congressional, activity in the current constitutional law system.
If flag-burning threatens the First Amendment, the threat comes
from the unique appeal underlying calls, like President Bush's in
1990 or Republican Congressional leaders in the late 1990s, for a
constitutional amendment. Veteran groups have reason to disdain
68. TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 57-65.
69. Id. at 59-60.
70. Id. at 60.
71. See id. at 57-65.
72. See Tiefer, supra note 62, at 357. My role for the House of Representatives was to
argue the defense of the Flag Protection Act in two district court cases, and then to brief the
defense in the Supreme Court. As discussed in my article, I believe that the effort by the
House of Representatives to enact and to defend that statute materially contributed to the
public's ultimate willingness, as tempers on this issue cooled, to tolerate disobeying President
Bush's call for a constitutional amendment. See id. at 377. One of the points of the matter,
that only achieves special interest at a later time, consists of how the Justice Department's
initial coolness to defending the statute (in contrast to the Administration's eagerness to call
for a constitutional amendment) gave way when the matter went to the Supreme Court, to
the conscientiousness of the Solicitor General in defending the statute. See id. at 369. The
Solicitor General, who conscientiously performed that defense, and thereby performed a
sincere and real service to aid the efforts of Congressional Democrats to protect the
Constitution, was Kenneth Starr.
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flag-burning, as minority groups have to disdain hate speech and
traditional-values groups have to disdain pornography in channels
accessible to minors. When such groups make their efforts to protect
the public against what they consider disgusting and noxious
expression by trying to carve out some exceptions to the First
Amendment through constitutional amendment, we get a form of
constitutional lawmaking in which the Court has no role. The story
of how, initially in 1989-90, and then in the decade since, a constitu-
tional amendment for the flag has been fended off in Congress, tells
us much about how constitutional law evolves in the real
world-where it counts, which is not just in courts, but in legislative
forums.
III. TUSHNET'S VALUE
Let me work toward the value of Tushnet's approach, which I will
call his purely normative favorable evaluation of populist constitu-
tional law. I will start with some elimination. First, what the court-
centered approach does, his approach does not do. At its best, the
court-centered approach equips us to address disputes and their
resolution by the Supreme Court. At its least, it helps us analyze
individual court decisions, or synthesize multiple ones. It may help
us criticize them. It might possibly even help us predict future ones.
Tushnet eschews all of this. Indeed, he cites far fewer decisions of
the Court than most comparable books on constitutional law. To
paraphrase Shakespeare's Mark Anthony, Tushnet certainly does
not come to praise judicial review, and he may even come to bury it.
Second, what the poli-dynamic approach does, his approach does
not do. Take as an example what political dynamicists might do
with the Congress's fending off, for the past decade, a constitutional
amendment about flag protection. Part of this has to do with public
attitudes that might be elucidated by sensitive articulators and
probers of values-like press commentators or pollsters. Part of this
has to do with legislators' attitudes. Tushnet identifies the right
target when he disputes the simplistic view that looks down on
legislators as afflicted detrimentally, and obsessively, by the "Vice"
of legislative reelection incentives."3 But, exploring what in legisla-
tors' attitudes actually maintains constitutional law involves
investigating the subtleties of constitution-defending attitudes and
73. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 96-104.
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discourses among legislators that differ between parties, ideologies,
regions, and time periods. Yet another part has to do with legisla-
tive organization, of committee jurisdictions and floor agenda
controls, which guarantee annual enactment of a thousand appropri-
ation accounts while miraculously fending off constitutional
amendments, sometimes for decades.
Tushnet has much more interest and sympathy for Congress than
other constitutional law theorists. And, while many of them consider
themselves ace political thinkers-but are not-Tushnet modestly
makes no expansive claims to political insight-while displaying a
good deal. His discussion, footnotes, and bibliography show atten-
tion to political science and historical writing. Nevertheless, to take
the example of flag protection, committed political dynamicists
would immerse themselves in studies of public attitudes, legislators'
attitudes, or legislative organization as these relate to constitutional
debates and resolutions outside the courts. Tushnet has interest in
these, but only some interest.
Moreover, bypurely normative, I mean that Tushnet does not take
his favorable evaluation of the imaginary situation of doing without
judicial review beyond the stage of pure evaluation. He does not
discuss how to get from where we are to anywhere near to the
situation he favors. Of course, the Supreme Court will not overrule
Marbury v. Madison.74 But, there are two ways we could get closer
to there from here. First, we might persuade the Court to reduce
judicial review, perhaps by picking the areas of judicial review for
which the Court might be most open to such persuasion. For
example, in the 1930s, the Court backed off from substantive due
process review of regulatory legislation.75 In the 1980s, the Court
backed offfrom federalism review of federal statutes, only to resume
this in the late 1990s.76 Tushnet does not differentiate among areas
of judicial review, so he does not provide a stepwise program for
persuading the Court to reduce the number of areas in which the
Court performs judicial review.
Tushnet could, but does not, propose techniques to reduce judicial
review by the elected branches shielding themselves more from
judicial review. Second, we could put forth statutes (again, perhaps,
74. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
75. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
76. Compare Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75-76 (1996), with Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530 (1985).
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in particular subject matter areas) adjusting sovereign immunity,
judicial remedies, or the Court's appellate jurisdiction itself to curb
judicial review. Or, we could support litmus tests for new Justices
regarding lesser judicial review. At least, we could urge the elected
branches to do more of what we think is good, like reports, hearings,
debates, regulations, and legislation on constitutional law subjects.
Tushnet is neither a rabble-rouser nor a program-planner and none
of this interests him much.77
So what does Tushnet's theoretical exploration teach us, particu-
larly about Congress? It provides a wealth of concepts and insights
for a view of the development of constitutional law by Congress
normatively favorable from a populist direction. That is, Tushnet
provides a rich and fresh defense of nonjudicial sources of constitu-
tional law, based on the theory of popular pro-Constitution atti-
tudes. His defense comes from a belief that the American public
historically adheres to normatively good values on constitutional
issues. His public is the public that rallied behind the Declaration
of Independence, ratified the Constitution and the Bill of Rights,
elected and reelected Washington and Jefferson, defended the
Union, sustained progressivism during the dark days of the
Lochner-era Court, ultimately welcomed into victory the Civil Rights
Movement of the 1950s and 1960s, restored constitutional balance
in the 1970s to national government after the Cold War decades of
an imperial presidency, and in recent years has backed women's and
minorities' rights even as the Rehnquist Court has not. The public
deserves to be empowered to carry forward its basically good
impulses on constitutional subjects because nothing is more
American than our shared commitment to our Constitution.
Tushnet leads this evaluation from an angle where it has not been
led before-an angle largely independent of an ideological critique of
the current (or historical) Supreme Court. I must admit that when
I first started to read the book, I assumed Tushnet would jump with
both feet on unpopular current Supreme Court decisions to illus-
trate his theory. So many critics think the Court has been misguided
in City of Boerne v. Flores,71 or in its recent string of five-to-four
77. For a conservative who proposes much ofthe same programjust described, see Meese,
supra note 17, at 791 ("The Senate should use its confirmation authority to block the
appointment of activist federal judges .... Congress should exercise its power to limit the
jurisdiction of the federal courts .. .
78. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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decisions striking down Acts of Congress on federalism grounds, 9
that I took it for granted Tushnet would cite these as Exhibit "A" for
his critique of judicial review. Yet, City of Boerne gets a brief
mention in the Prologue,8" and the questionable federalism decisions
barely get a nod at all.
Let us contrast past critiques of excessive judicial review and
inadequate judicial deference to the elected branches with Tushnet's
favorable evaluation of populist constitutional law. Traditionally,
past critiques of judicial review have come from whatever ideology
most dislikes the contemporary Court. For the first third of the
century, as a conservative Lochner Court struck down progressive
legislation on subjects like child labor and maximum hours,8'
liberals complained about judicial review. From the 1950s on, as a
liberal Warren Court expanded constitutional protections for
minorities, alleged subversives, and criminal defendants, conserva-
tives complained about judicial review. Now, in the past decade, a
(slim) conservative" majority on the Rehnquist Court has begun
striking down progressive legislation-legislation creating rights
against states (as invading federalism),83 campaign finance legisla-
tion (as invading the free speech rights of well-heeled interests),'
and affirmative action legislation (as invading the civil rights of the
majority)85-it is, again, progressives who have increasingly com-
plained about judicial review. In each of these eras, to be sure, the
complainants about judicial review tapped into recurring ideologi-
cally neutral themes-the lack of democratic legitimacy of the courts,
and the institutional superiority for making accountable policy
decisions of the elected branches. Still, the complaints have
obviously developed in part from the ideological unhappiness in each
era by those oriented oppositely to the Court's direction.
While Tushnet does critique the Court's current direction, that is
only a small part of his presentation. He ranges over past decades
to show his critique ofjudicial review transcends preferences for (or
against) particular Supreme Court decisions. For example, he
79. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365,2368 (1997); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
80. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 4.
81. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905).
82. For a discussion of the ideological swing, see Robin West, Progressive and
Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641 (1990).
83. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999).
84. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604,613-23 (1996).
85. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995).
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devotes an entire chapter (Chapter Four) to "The Constitutional
Law of Religion Outside the Courts."8 He devotes relatively little
room to critiquing Supreme Court decisions. Rather, he shows how
the Establishment Clause fits with America's political heritage of
religious diversity, pluralism, and tolerance.8" And he works at
discussing how political dialogue could occur between the relatively
tolerant secular groups and mainstream religions, on the one hand,
and "the dynamic evangelical churches whose political activism has
provoked much liberal concern about the role of religion in politics"8
on the other. This is Tushnet at his best: sensitive to the other side
in a debate, bringing the skills of the legal scholar not just to the
(comparatively easy) task of writing for the judicial forum, but also
to the (comparatively harder) task of finding the merit in discourse
among the highly different groups found in the political forums.
In short, Tushnet has rendered a great service by his imaginative
and wide-ranging intellectual synthesis of a normatively supportive,
nonideological argument for a populist constitutional law. He makes
an original and invaluable contribution on a subject of much
historical debate and continuing central importance.89 Let us hope
his book will be a wake-up call to the dogmatic slumberers of court-
centered constitutional law.
86. TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 72-94.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 81.
89. For a historical treatment, see Gary Apfel, Whose Constitution Is It Anyway? The
Authority of the Judiciary's Interpretation of the Constitution, 46 RUTGERSL. REV. 771 (1994).
